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NEW PAYMENT DEVICES AND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PAYMENT LAW
Gregory E. Maggs*
Consumers and businesses, at present, tend to use just a handful
of familiar devices to pay debts, make purchases, and transfer funds.
Consumers, for example, rarely employ anything other than cash,
checks, credit cards, and debit cards.' Businesses use each of these
methods of payment and, more often than consumers, also move
funds with wholesale wire transfers and letters of credit.2
More payment options, however, are becoming available. Ad-
vances in computers and communication technology are making pos-
sible the development and rapid implementation of a variety of new
devices. For example, in some locations, consumers now can use
stored-value cards-cards that contain electronic codes representing
sums of money-to make many kinds of purchases.3 In addition, sev-
eral companies recently have set up new payment systems to allow in-
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
The author thanks Dean Jack Friedenthal and the Law School for its generous
support. My colleague J. Andrew Spanogle provided helpful advice.
1 See David B. Humphrey & Allen N. Berger, Market Failure and Resource Use: Eco-
nomic Incentives to Use Different Payment Instruments, in THE UNrED STATES PAYMENT
SYSTEM: EFSCIENCy, RISK AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 45, 77 (David B.
Humphrey ed. 1990) (providing statistics on and explaining the use of different pay-
ment devices).
2 See id. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) refers to wholesale wire trans-
fers simply as "funds transfers." See U.C.C. Prefatory Note art. 4A (1995). Consumers
can make wholesale wire transfers in certain instances. See Regulation E, 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.3 (b) (1996) (stating exemption from the Electronic Fund Transfer Act). Some
letters of credit serve a guaranty function as opposed to a payment function. See
U.C.C. Prefatory Note art. 5 (1995) (discussing standby letters of credit).
3 See Valerie Block, Four Giants Join in New York Smart Card Test, AM. BANKER, Apr.
11, 1996, at 1 (describing implementation of stored-value cards in various locations);
Penny Lunt, The Smart Cards are Coming! But Will They Stay?2, ABA BANKINGJ., Sept. 1,
1995, at 46 (same).
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dividuals and businesses to transfer funds over the Internet.4 More
developments of this kind seem likely in the future.5
New payment devices present a challenge to the legal system.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and a variety of federal stat-
utes and regulations specify the rules governing most established pay-
ment devices. 6 Because of their novelty, however, no codes or
regulations comprehensively govern new payment devices.7 Although
private contracts determine some of the rights and liabilities of the
parties who use them, these contracts do not and often cannot specify
all of the necessary rules. 8
This Article attempts to address some of the legal problems asso-
ciated with new payment devices. It suggests an approach that courts
can follow when fashioning rules to govern the new devices. The ap-
proach rests on general principles of payment law, or the common
ideas and policies that underlie the rules applicable to the various es-
tablished payment devices.
The Article consists of five parts. Part I defines the term "new
payment device," and then discusses several examples. The examples
include stored-value cards and Internet payment devices created by
DigiCash Inc. and First Virtual Inc. Part I also suggests reasons that
these and other new payment devices should become increasingly
popular in the future.
Part II argues that courts inevitably will need to create common
law rules to resolve disputes over new payment devices. It explains
that economic and other obstacles will prevent parties involved in pay-
4 See Saul Hansell, Today, Shoppers on Internet Get Access to Electronic Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at D5; Jeff Frentzen, Internet-Based Payment Schemes are Starting to
Catch Fire, P.C. WEEK, Sept. 4, 1995, at 16; Michael Wolff, Net Selling, FoRBES, Aug. 28,
1995, at 30; Net Profits: The Electronic Soul Is Open for Business, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995,
at 50 (Survey 12); Andrew Singleton, Cash on the Wirehead, BytE, June 1, 1995, at 71;
Amy Cortese & Kelley Holland, What's the Color of Cybermoney?, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1995,
at 36.
5 See Penny Lunt, Payments on the 'Net: How Many? How Safe?, ABA BANKINGJ.,
Nov. 1995, at 46; Steven Levy, The End of Money , NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 62; Kelly
Holland & Amy Cortese, The Future of Money, Bus. WK., Jun. 12, 1995, at 66.
6 The UCC contains four articles that govern existing payment devices. See
U.C.C. arts. 3 & 4 (1995) (checks); id. art. 4A (1989) (funds transfers); id. art. 5
(1995) (letters of credit). A variety of federal regulations complement the UCC. See
Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-.42 (1996) (checks); Regulation E, id. §§ 205.1-.14
(1996) (consumer electronic funds transfers); Regulation J, id. §§ 210.1-.32 (checks
and wire transfers). No statutes or regulations comprehensively regulate credit cards,
but federal law does impose certain consumer protections. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1642-
1646, 1666i (1994).
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part I.
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ment transactions from including in private contracts all the rules nec-
essary for governing new payment devices. Moreover, experience and
other factors suggest that neither Congress nor state legislatures will
enact codes or statutes to govern each new payment device. As a re-
sult, courts must develop many of the rules on their own.
Part III proposes and describes the approach that courts should
use when developing common law rules to govern new payment de-
vices. In the past, courts have created rules for new payment devices
by guessing about the parties' unstated intentions or by analogizing
the new payment devices to existing payment devices. To avoid diffi-
culties associated with these methods, Part III argues that courts in-
stead should attempt to discern general principles that animate the
rules governing established payment devices. Courts then should ap-
ply these general principles to decide cases involving new payment
devices.
Part IV illustrates the general principles approach. It considers
several basic issues that could arise in transactions involving new pay-
ment devices. These issues include (1) whether the payor may stop or
revoke payment; (2) whether the payee has a right of recourse against
the payor if something goes wrong; and (3) whether the payor may
assert claims against other participants in a payment transaction if the
payee takes the money and falls to perform. For each of these issues,
Part IV explains how a court could identify and use general principles
of payment law to create common law rules to govern new payment
devices.
Part V states a brief conclusion. It explains that, while the gen-
eral principles approach will help courts decide many disputes, it will
not resolve all issues that new payment devices might present. A need
may exist, for example, to regulate payment devices to prevent their
use in criminal activities, like money laundering, or to protect the in-
terests of consumers. The general principles approach does not pre-
clude legislatures from enacting statutes or agencies from
promulgating regulations for these purposes. The approach merely
helps courts to resolve private disputes in the absence of clear rules.
I. NEW PAYMENT DEVICES
For the purpose of this Article, "new payment devices" are mecha-
nisms of making payment or transferring funds that have not become
firmly rooted in the legal system. The term, in other words, applies to
any devices not governed by statute, regulation, well-defined case law,
or industry-wide standard contracts. It consequently does not include
1997]
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established devices like cash, checks, credit cards, wholesale and con-
sumer wire transfers, and letters of credit.
The following discussion describes in detail three prominent ex-
amples of new payment devices. It then explains the important dis-
tinction between new payment devices and the use of old payment
devices in new ways. Finally, it presents some predictions about future
developments in payment technology and practices.
A. Examples of New Payment Devices
Consumers and businesses can employ new payment devices in a
variety of contexts. Some new devices function best in ordinary shop-
ping environments where they provide a substitute for cash, checks,
credit cards, and debit cards. Other new payment devices function
only on computer networks. Three examples illustrate a few of the
possibilities:
1. Stored-Value Cards
Consumers increasingly are making payments with "stored-value
cards" (also called "prepaid cards" or "value-added cards"). 9 These
cards use a magnetic strip or a microchip to hold an encoded number
representing a sum of money.10 The issuer of the card initially sets
the number to reflect the dollar value of the card.1 As the consumer
makes purchases, a machine reduces the number to reflect the
amount of money spent.12 When the number reaches zero the card
ceases to have any value.
For example, a consumer might buy a stored-value card from an
issuer for $20. The issuer would put a code representing $20 on the
card. When the holder uses the card to buy a $5 product, the seller
would run the card through a device that would change the value
stored on the card from $20 to $15. The consumer could then make
$15 worth of additional purchases.
Stored-value cards already have become common in several areas
of commerce. For example, at many libraries, patrons may purchase
copy cards from vending machines.' 3 The copy cards use a magnetic
9 For a current and concise description of stored-value cards, see Supplementary
Information, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,698 (1996); see also RobertJ. Egan, Banking in
Cyberspace: Smart Cards and Electronic Money, 912 PLI/Co,. 473, 477-78 (1995) (defin-
ing numerous terms and concepts associated with stored-value cards).






strip to hold a code representing a dollar figure. Patrons may use the
card to make photocopies. For every copy *made, a card reader
reduces the code on the card by the cost of making a copy (typically
about ten cents). Patrons may increase the value of the card by in-
serting the card and additional cash into a machine.
Commuters, similarly, use stored-value cards to pay for public
transportation in many areas. 14 For example, in Washington, D.C.
and San Francisco, California, subway riders may purchase farecards
from vending machines. These cards, like copy cards, use a magnetic
strip to hold a code indicating their value. Turnstiles at the entrance
and exit of the subway platforms read the cards and subtract the appli-
cable fares.
Stored-value cards make routine purchases more convenient. For
instance, in the case of copy cards and subway fare cards, they elimi-
nate the need for users to handle a pocketful of coins. The library
and subway systems, moreover, do not require third-party authoriza-
tion for each use, as do some credit cards and debit cards. The pay-
ment process, as a result, proceeds much quicker.15
Stored-value cards have some disadvantages. Most cards, for in-
stance, present the same risks as cash. As result, users tend to worry
about putting too much money on them. A patron who loses a subway
card with $10 on it, for instance, suffers the same loss as someone who
loses a $10 bill.16 Stored-value cards, as a result, do not work well (at
present) for large purchases.
Three very important developments presently are occurring with
respect to stored-value cards. First, an increasingly wider variety of
businesses are beginning to issue and accept stored-value cards. For
example, in addition to copy cards and subway farecards, consumers
now can buy cards usable to make telephone calls, rent movies, buy
gasoline, and wash and dry clothes at laundromats.
17
Second, various organizations, including the VISA and Master-
Card Corporations, are developing generic stored-value cards that
cardholders may use to make purchases from many different
14 See id.
15 See Lunt, supra note 3, at 46.
16 See id. But see Egan, supra note 9, at 473 (suggesting that liability for a lost card
remains an open issue).
17 See Christine Dugas, Prepaid Plastic For Purchases Proliferates, USA TODAY, Dec.
22, 1995, at 01B; James McNair, A New Spin on Laundry: Coin Boxes Replaced ly Card
Readers, MIAMI HmER1, Jan. 12, 1995, at IC; Supplementary Information, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 19,698; Egan, supra note 9, at 473.
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merchants.1 8 At present, a person needs one card to make photo-
copies and another card to pay a subway fare. In the future, however,
numerous merchants will accept the same card. This development
will make stored-value cards far more convenient. 19
Third, stored-value cards may become programmable. Most
stored-value cards currently utilize a magnetic strip to hold their
codes. Soon, however, more stored-value cards will have tiny
microprocessors that can perform various functions, such as limiting
unauthorized usage. 20 This development may make the cards less vul-
nerable to theft and, accordingly, facilitate their use in transactions
involving larger sums of money. Banks and merchants refer to
programmable stored-value cards as "smart cards."
'21
The legal system, unfortunately, does not address stored-value
cards in a clear fashion. The cards do not come within the scope of
the UCC because they do not satisfy the formal definitions of negotia-
ble instruments,22 funds transfers, 23 or letters of credit.2 4 The cards
also do not qualify as credit cards because consumers prepay the value
of the cards.
25
Most stored-value cards, moreover, do not come within the ambit
of the Electronic Funds Transfer Regulation (Regulation E). Regula-
tion E, as presently written, applies only to the devices, like debit
cards, that facilitate the transfer of funds into or out of a consumer's
bank account.2 6 Stored-value cards of the kind issued by mass transit
authorities and libraries operate without the use of banks or accounts.
The Federal Reserve Board, indeed, recently has proposed
amendments to Regulation E that would clarify the status of stored-
18 See Block, supra note 3, at 1 (describing large scale pilot tests of open systems in
the United States and abroad); Lunt, supra note 3, at 46 (same); see also Egan, supra
note 9, at 473, 477 (describing these kinds of cards as "open system" stored-value
cards).
19 See Lunt, supra note 3, at 46, 48 (noting that consumers want the ability to use a
single cards at more stores); Dugas, supra note 17, at 01B (same).
20 Lunt, supra note 3, at 46.
21 See id.; Egan, supra note 9, at 347; Block, supra note 3, at 1.
22 See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1995) (defining a negotiable instrument as "a written
promise to pay money meeting several specified formal requirements").
23 See id. § 4A-104(a) (1989) (defining a funds transfer as a series of payment
orders from an originator through the originator's and beneficiary's banks to the
beneficiary).
24 See id. § 5-102(a) (10) (1995) (defining a letter of credit).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k) (1994) (defining "credit card" as a device used for
"obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit").
26 See Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (1993).
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value cards. 27 The amendments specifically exempt from coverage
any stored-value card systems in which balances are maintained only
on the card and not in a separate database.28 The amendments also
exempt any cards that cannot store more than $100 in value at any
given time, even if the issuer maintains a separate record of the card's
balance.29 The amendments would impose minimal disclosure re-
quirements for other card systems.30
Most rights that users have with respect to stored-value cards, as a
result, come only from private contracts. Unfortunately, in many
cases no discussion of contract terms occurs when a purchaser buys or
uses a card. Subway patrons, for example, buy cards by the millions
and never talk about the terms governing the cards.
True, even without elaborate discussion, some implied contrac-
tual terms may exist. For example, the issuer of stored-value cards
presumably makes an implicit promise to accept payments made by
the card. The purchaser likewise presumably warrants, in using the
card, that no one has tampered with the codes stored in the magnetic
strip. Plenty of room for disagreement, nonetheless, exists over the
content of such implied terms.
2. Ecash
DigiCash, Inc. has invented and successfully implemented a new
payment device called "Ecash" for making purchases over the In-
ternet.31 To use Ecash, a customer first must open and deposit money
27 Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed Apr. 19, 1996).
28 See id. at 19,704 (proposing a new 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(b) that would apply only
to cards for which a balance is separately maintained). The Federal Reserve System
refers to these cards as "off-line accountable" cards. See id. at 19,701.
29 See id. at 19,704 (proposing a new 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) that would create a
$100 exemption).
30 See id. (proposing a new 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(d) that would require disclosures
for these so-called "off-line accountable" systems). For the treatment of other cards,
which require authorization and thus resemble debit cards more than stored-value
cards, see id. at 19,704-05 (proposing a new 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(e) to govern so-called
"on-line accountable" cards).
31 DigiCash claims "Ecash" as a trademark. For primary source information
about Ecash, see DigiCash Ecash-about Ecash (visited Nov. 26, 1996) <http://
www.digicash.com/ecash/about.html>. For overviews of the system, see Hansell,
supra note 4, at D4; Singleton, supra note 4, at 74; Alan Deutschman, Money Wants to
Be Anonymous, WoRTH, Oct. 1995, at 95.
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in an account at a bank that participates in the Ecash system.3 2 The
customer can withdraw funds from the account by asking the bank to
issue Ecash "coins. '3 3 These coins come in various denominations,
like $1, $5, and $10. The coins consist of codes that the customer
stores on a home computer.
34
The customer spends Ecash coins by transmitting them to
merchants over the Internet.3 5 The merchant then presents the coins
to the issuing bank, which examines their codes to verify that it actu-
ally issued them.36 Because the customer has the ability to make cop-
ies of the coins, the bank also confirms that it previously has not
redeemed a coin having the same codes.3 7 If the bank does not detect
a problem, the bank accepts the coin and credits the merchant's bank
account with dollars. 38 Otherwise, the bank tells the merchant that
the coin is invalid.
3 9
Ecash resembles stored-value cards in many respects. Consumers
prepay the value of the Ecash coins and then later spend them. Ecash
differs from stored-value cards primarily in that the codes represent-
ing the value of the coins are stored in a computer rather than on a
physical card. Like stored-value cards, Ecash would not seem to fall
within the scope of the UCC or the federal statutes regulating credit
cards. Again, it simply does not meet the formal requirements for
coverage under those laws.
Regulation E, moreover, would appear to govern only part of an
Ecash transaction. The regulation may cover a customer's initial re-
quest to withdraw funds in the form of Ecash coins. The request con-
stitutes an "electronic funds transfer" because it is a "transfer of
funds ... that is initiated through [a] . . . computer.., for the pur-
pose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to
debit.., an account."40 The consumer, in particular, tells the issuing
bank to take money out of his or her account and to issue Ecash coins.
Once the customer receives the coins, however, the law does not
regulate the spending and verification process. At that point, the
32 DigiCash Ecash--Ecash issuers (visited Nov. 26, 1996) <http://www.digicash.
com/Ecash/Ecash/issuers.html> (listing participating banks worldwide that accept
Ecash).








40 See 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g).
[VOL- 72:3
1997] NEW PAYMENT DEVICES 761
money already has come out of the customer's account and the regu-
lation has nothing to say about it. The rules governing these aspects
of Ecash transactions, accordingly, again come only from the express
or implied contracts that merchants, customers, issuing banks, and
DigiCash make with each other.
41
3. First Virtual
First Virtual Holdings Inc. has developed an alternative payment
system to facilitate transactions on the Internet.4 2 The system uses a
combination of credit card charges, fund transfers, and email
messages to enable consumers to pay merchants for goods or services
advertised on the Internet. The system combines safety with elegant
simplicity.
Before using the First Virtual payment system for the first time,
buyers and sellers must apply for service.43 To obtain service, a buyer
needs to have a credit card and an Internet email address.4 Buyers
apply for First Virtual service by calling First Virtual on the telephone
and giving the company their credit card information.45 First Virtual
then assigns a personal identification number to the buyer called a
"VirtualPIN."
46
Sellers apply to First Virtual by sending the company a completed
form along with a small fee (presently $10).47 The form asks the seller
to supply the number of a checking account that will accept direct
deposits from the United States Automated Clearing House system. 48
Sellers need to have an Internet email address, but do not need to
have authority to accept credit cards.
49
A buyer who has obtained a VirtualPIN can pay a seller who has
applied for First Virtual service through a simple process. The buyer
41 DigiCash licenses its software to banks. Banks then allow merchants and cus-
tomers to open bank accounts. Each bank may impose slightly different require-
ments. Customers and merchants make contracts with each other when they use
Ecash.
42 For primary information about the First Virtual systems, see FV Homepage (vis-
ited Nov. 26, 1996) <http://www.fv.com>. For summaries of the system, see Single-
ton, supra note 4, at 74.
43 See FV: Payment System Summary (visited Nov. 26, 1996) <http://www.
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sends the VirtualPIN to the seller by email.5 0 The seller, upon ob-
taining the buyer's VirtualPIN, sends an email message to First Vir-
tual.5 ' The email message contains the buyer's VirtualPIN and tells
First Virtual the price of the sale.
52
When First Virtual receives the seller's email message, it attempts
to verify the transaction. First Virtual performs this process by send-
ing an email message to the buyer.55 This email message indicates the
name of the seller and the amount of the transaction. The message
asks the buyer to confirm the transaction.
54
If the customer confirms the sale, First Virtual then takes two
steps to effect payment. First, using the information previously sup-
plied by the buyer, First Virtual charges the buyer's credit card by the
amount of the payment.5 5 Second, First Virtual transfers to the
seller's bank account the purchase price minus a small transaction
fee.5 6 In this way, the buyer pays, the seller obtains payment, and First
Virtual receives compensation for its services.
Some aspects of a First Virtual transaction fit comfortably within
the rules governing existing payment devices. First Virtual, for in-
stance, must follow the rules governing credit cards when it charges
the buyer's account. It also must comply with the various require-
ments involved in transferring funds to the seller's account.
The method of sending email messages for initiating and con-
firming the transaction, however, does not fall under any statutes or
regulations. The email message that the buyer sends to the seller
closely resembles a "payable through" draft as described in article 4 of
the UCC.5 7 In a payable through draft transaction, a bank must check
with the drawer of an instrument before paying it.58 The First Virtual








57 See U.C.C. § 4-106 (1995).
58 For example, an insurance company may issue a payable through draft to a
policy holder in settlement of a claim. The policy holder will take the check to the
insurance company's bank. The bank will then present the instrument to the insur-
ance company, usually by calling the insurance company on the telephone. If the
insurance company agrees to make the payment, the bank will charge the company's
account and pay the payee. Although somewhat cumbersome, payable through drafts
serve an important purpose. In particular, they eliminate the need for a drawer like
an insurance company to keep large sums of money in a checking account. If the
(VOL- 72:3
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email messages involved in First Virtual transaction because they do
not meet the formal definitions of a "negotiable instrument"59 or an
"item."60 Instead, the messages merely contain the buyer's VirtualPIN
and the amount of the payment.
Consequently, as with stored-value cards and Ecash, only private
contracts specify the rules governing certain aspects of First Virtual
transactions. First Virtual, in fact, has created standard agreements
that it makes with buyers and sellers.61 Buyers and sellers may also
make contracts with each other when entering transactions. These
contracts, however, probably do not resolve all possible conflicts.
B. Old Payment Devices Used in New Ways
In recent years, banks and businesses have attempted to develop
new ways to make payments using well-established payment devices.
This trend, unlike the creation of new payment devices, generally
does not pose much of a challenge to the legal system. The rules gov-
erning existing payment devices, for the most part, operate adequately
in many different contexts.
Many consumers, for example, now use software provided by
their banks to pay their monthly bills.6 2 Citicorp, Inc.'s "Direct Ac-
cess" software is typical.63 Users call up the Citibank computer from
their homes and inform the bank whom to pay and how much to pay
them. Citibank electronically debits the users' accounts and then
drawer needs more money to pay its drafts, it can transfer more funds into the ac-
count before authorizing payment.
59 U.C.C. § 3-102 (1995) (stating that article 3 applies to negotiable instruments);
id. § 3-104(a) (defining a negotiable instrument to require a promise or order); id.
§ 3-103(a) (6) (defining order as "a written instruction to pay money"); id. § 3-
103(a) (8) (defining a promise as "a written undertaking to pay money").
60 Id. § 4-104(a) (9).
61 See First Virtual Buyer Terms and Conditions (visited Nov. 26, 1996) <http://
www.fv.com/pubdocs/fineprint-buyer.txt> (stating contract between First Virtual and
buyers); First Virtual Holdings Incorporated Pioneer Seller Terms and Conditions (visited
Nov. 26, 1996) <http://www.fv.com/pubdocs/fineprint-seller.txt> (stating contract
between First Virtual and sellers).
62 See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,696 (1996) (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve) (discussing "home banking services"); Saul Han-
sell, Banking at Home: Once More, with Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, § 3, at 1
(describing recent industry trends); Walter S. Mossberg, Banking by PC Doesn't Do
Enough to Ease a Grim Task, WALL ST.J., Dec. 7, 1995, at B1 (reviewing software);Jared
Sandberg, American Express Goes On-Line for Card Holders, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at
A3 (describing new system).
63 Citibank claims "Direct Access" as a trademark. For information on the system,
see Saul Hansell, Citibank Will End Most Fees on Electronic Transactions, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1995, at D1.
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makes the requested payments, either by using a funds transfer or by
issuing checks. Other companies have made available similar
software.
64
Despite the novelty of these bill payment systems, they generally
do not qualify as new payment devices for the purpose of this Article.
The systems, although new in format, come within the scope of well-
established legal rules. Regulation E governs home banking transac-
tions to the extent that they involve consumer electronic funds trans-
fers. 65 Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC govern them to the extent that
they involve checks.
66
Comparable developments have occurred on the Internet with
respect to credit cards. Instead of paying for goods or services using
new payment devices like Ecash or a VirtualPIN, many Internet users
simply transmit their credit card information. 67 To prevent unauthor-
ized persons from obtaining access to the information while it travels
over the Internet, several companies-including Netscape, Inc.6 8 and
Cybercash, Inc.69-have developed special encryption software. The
software converts the credit card information into a secret code, thus
reducing worries about credit card fraud.
Like the innovative systems for paying bills using electronic wire
transfers and checks, systems designed to encrypt and then send
credit card information over the Internet do not qualify as new pay-
ment devices. The rules that govern credit card information sent over
the telephone or by mail should apply to credit card information
transmitted from computer to computer. Although the encryption
process may have advantages, it does not present important new ques-
tions to the legal system.
Courts, accordingly, should observe caution when confronting
developments in payment systems. Genuinely new payment devices
require special attention, as the following parts of this Article explain.
64 See Wayne Kawamoto, Software You Can Bank On, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Mar. 1,
1996, at 508 (reviewing popular software packages supplied by 4Home Productions,
Meca Software, Microsoft Corp., and Intuit); Hansell, supra note 62, § 3, at 1 (describ-
ing services offered by other banks).
65 See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,696-97 (describing the appli-
cation of Regulation E to home banking).
66 See U.C.C. § 3-102(a) (1995) (defining the scope of article 3); id. § 4-102 (de-
fining the applicability of article 4).
67 SeeJeffrey Kufler, Currency of the Internet Realm? So Far, It's Plastic, Am. BANKER,
Sept. 21, 1995, at 1.
68 See On Security (visitedJan. 15, 1997) <http://home.netscape.com/info/ secur-
ity-doc.
htm/>.
69 See Cybercash Home (visited Jan. 15, 1997) <http://www.cybercash.com>.
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By contrast, old payment devices-such as electronic funds transfers,
checks, and credit cards-generally fall within the scope of existing
legal rules even when employed in new contexts.
C. Predictions for the Future
Some people looking at new payment devices like those de-
scribed above have suggested that they might bring about the end of
money as we know it.70 Others, however, have cautioned about over-
estimating the benefits of new technology.7' Regardless of their ulti-
mate impact, however, efforts to create and implement new payment
devices almost certainly will continue for two reasons.
First, technological advances are making new payment devices
easier to create and implement. Attempts to develop new payment
devices in the past had to overcome great difficulties. For example,
when Bank of America wanted to issue the first bank credit cards in
California, it faced huge technical problems in getting the project off
the ground. It had to organize thousands of potential cardholders
and merchants, and it had no convenient way to test the project or to
prevent and detect fraud.72
Computers and improved communication networks largely can
solve these problems. They can create simulated environments that
allow developers to experiment with new products. Indeed, as one
writer has put it, the Internet "is proving to be a tremendous forcing-
ground for ideas and experiments that, if they succeed, will have im-
plications extending far beyond the Internet itself."73 For example,
DigiCash conducted a massive on-line experiment before it allowed
issuers to use Ecash for real payments.74 Computers also can make
possible new security measures, such as instant encryption and instant
verification of codewords. These factors will enable developers to de-
vise new and better payment systems with less difficulty.
Second, new payment devices potentially could generate massive
revenues for their developers. Americans presently make hundreds of
70 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 5, at 62; Holland & Cortese, supra note 5, at 66; Paul
Maidment, The Age of Cybercash: E-Money Will Change Our Lives-Once it Becomes More
than Just E-Payments, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 1994, at 128.
71 See, e.g., Daniel Pearl, Futurist Schlock: Today's Cyberhype Has a Familiar Ring,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1995, at Al (arguing that "glowing views of the Internet ignore a
very old lesson" about the pitfalls of predicting the benefits of new technology).
72 SeeJoseph Nocera, The Day the Credit Card Was Born, WASH. PosT. MAG., Dec. 4,
1994, at 17, 42 (describing the implementation of the Bank of America credit card).
73 See Electronic Money: So Much for the Cashless Society, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1994, at
21.
74 See Hansell, supra note 4, at D5.
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trillions of dollars in payments each year.75 Banks and other firms
profit from these payments in a wide variety of ways. Inventors and
marketers, accordingly, have an incentive to develop new payment de-
vices to compete with the existing devices and capture some of their
business.
For example, some firms earn money by charging payors or pay-
ees a transaction fee in connection with payment devices. Credit card
issuers or processors, for example, charge merchants a percentage of
the sales price for processing credit card slips.76 Banks, similarly,
charge a fee for each cashier's check they issue and each wire transfer
they send. Developers of new payment devices similarly might make
money from transaction fees. Indeed, as noted above, First Virtual
charges sellers a small percentage of every sale.
77
The possible revenues from transaction fees almost stagger the
imagination. Every year, Americans make more than 5 billion credit
card payments, write more than 45 billion checks, and effect an even
larger number of cash payments.78 If a new payment device could
lure away even a small percentage of these transactions, tiny fees
would produce large sums.
Other firms benefit from the "float" of funds associated with pay-
ment devices. A float is a period of time in which a firm may use
money without paying interest.79 Issuers of traveler's checks, for ex-
ample, sell the checks at face value. They then have interest-free use
of the proceeds until someone presents the instruments for redemp-
75 See Humphrey & Berger, supra note 1, at 77.
76 See Suzanne Oliver, The Battle of the Credit Cards, FORBES, July 1, 1996, at 62, 65
(noting that merchants currently pay an estimated average fee of 1.9% on Visa and
Mastercard purchases, and a fee of 2.5% on American Express purchases); Jeremy
Quittner, Processing Paper on Wane, But Still Lucrative, Am. BANKER, Nov. 1, 1996, at 10
(discussing factors that affect the size of fees charged to merchants).
77 See First Virtual Payment System Summay (visited Nov. 26, 1996) <http://
www.fv.com/info/intro.html> (summarizing the process for becoming a buyer and
seller).
78 See Humphrey & Berger, supra note 1, at 77 (giving statistics on the volume of
cash transactions). See also Daniel Akst, In Cyberspace, Nobody Can Hear You Write a
Check, LA. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, at 20 (noting that cash still accounts for 80% of pay-
ment transactions in this country).
79 See PATRICK FRAZER, PLASTIC AND ELECTRONIC MONEY: NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 165-73 (1985); John M. Veale & Robert W. Price, Payment
System Float and Float Management, in THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND




tion. Developers of new payment devices, such as stored-value cards
and Ecash, may hope to benefit from a similar float of funds.80
Floats, like transaction fees, also potentially could produce large
revenues. American Express Corp., the largest seller of traveler's
checks, at any time has outstanding over $4 billion in unredeemed
traveler's checks. 81 It can invest a large portion of this money and
earn interest or dividends. Issuers of stored-value cards would like to
capture some of the traveler's check business. They also would like to
persuade Americans to use their cards instead of cash. Consumers
and businesses presently spend more than $1.4 trillion in cash each
year;82 a float on even a small portion of that money could enable the
issuers to earn a huge income.
Still other firms make money by charging interest on funds lent
in connection with payment devices. Credit card issuers, for example,
lend more than $470 billion each year to their customers.83 Surely an
incentive exists for someone to invent and implement an alternative
payment system that would capture some of the profits now enjoyed
by credit card issuers on these loans.
Finally, some firms have increased their sales of goods and serv-
ices by making available more convenient payment devices. For exam-
ple, transit systems issue stored-value cards to simplify the payment
process. They presume that people will ride the subway more often if
they can pay easily. Other new payment devices also might increase
sales. For example, some writers believe that Internet users would pay
a few cents for every page they read, if only a convenient method of
payment existed.8 4 Given the millions of Internet users who access
80 See Lunt, supra note 3, at 47 (discussing potential revenue from float and other
aspects of stored-value cards).
81 SeeJohn Eckhouse, 100 Years of Travelers Checks: Sales Continue to Rise, But Fierce
Competition is Challenging Issuers, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3, 1991, at B1.
82 See Humphrey & Berger, supra note 1, at 1.
83 See Lee Richardson, Let a Thousand Credit Cards Bloom, WALL ST. J., May 23,
1995, at A22. The credit card issuers do not earn interest on all of these funds be-
cause many card holders pay off the loans during the industry-standard 30 day grace
period. See Oliver, supra note 76, at 66 (noting that nearly 40% of credit card holders
pay their balances in full each month).
84 See, e.g., Arnold Kling, Banking on the Internet: Would You Pay 20 Cents to Read the
Rest of this Article, <http://gnn.digital.com/gnn/meta/finance/feat/bank.intro.
html>; Bob Metcalfe, Internet Digital Cash-Don't Leave Your Home Page Without It, IN-
FoWoRLD, Mar. 13, 1995, at 55.
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documents on the Internet every day,8 5 substantial aggregate sales
might take place.
II. INEVITABLE NEED FOR COMMON LAW RuLEs
As new payment devices proliferate and their use increases, legal
questions will quickly arise. Users of the devices will want to know the
requirements and risks associated with each device so they can choose
appropriately among the options available to them. Inventors and de-
velopers will want to know all of the relevant legal rules so that they
can create and implement new devices. Courts and lawyers also will
need rules so that they can resolve disputes as they arise.
Contracts made by the participants in payment transactions will
specify many of the necessary legal rules. The following discussion,
however, argues that private contracts invariably will have some short-
comings. Moreover, although the states or the federal government in
theory could remedy these shortcomings by statute, various practical
problems will prevent enactment of applicable legislation. Courts, as
a result, inevitably will have to fashion many of the rules necessary to
govern new payment devices in a common law manner.
A. Contracts
Users of new payment devices sometimes rely on detailed form
contracts to determine the rules governing their use. For example, as
noted above, First Virtual requires buyers and sellers to accept lengthy
written agreements covering VirtualPINs.8 6 The legal system should
encourage this practice because detailed contracts can reduce uncer-
tainty and prevent disputes. Yet private contracts are not panaceas
that can eliminate all disputes in payment transactions.
Contracts have four distinct shortcomings as a source of law.
First, the participants in payment transactions sometimes cannot form
contracts with each other. A typical funds transfer provides a simple
example. In a funds transfer, the "originator" of the transaction issues
a payment order to its own bank, the "originator's bank. '8 7 The order
typically directs the bank to transfer funds to a beneficiary. The bank
may use one or more "intermediary banks" to effect the transfer.88
85 SeeJared Sandberg, On-Line Population Reaches 24 Million in North America, WALL
ST.J., Oct. 30, 1995, at B3;Jennifer Tanaka & Brad Stone, Who's on the Web, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 13, 1995, at 14 (reporting an estimate of 37 million).
86 See supra Part IA.3.
87 U.C.C. § 4A-104(c)-(d) (1995).
88 Id. § 4A-104(b).
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Unless otherwise directed, the originator's bank has discretion to
choose which intermediary bank or banks to use to move the funds8 9
This arrangement prevents the parties from specifying all of the
rules necessary for the formation of adequate contracts. Because the
originator does not know which intermediaries its bank will choose,
the originator generally cannot form a contract with them. The legal
system, consequently, needs to specify the rules governing the inter-
mediary banks' actions. Article 4A of the UCC performs this
function.90
Negotiable instruments transactions supply another illustration.
Suppose a drawer writes a check, making it payable to bearer, and
then accidentally loses it. A stranger finds the check and negotiates it
to a good faith purchaser for value. The drawer and the good faith
purchaser could not have formed a contract in advance that would
specify the good faith purchaser's rights. The legal system, as a result,
needs to step in and establish rules. Article 3 of the UCC accom-
plishes this task.91
Comparable obstacles to forming contracts could arise with new
payment devices. For example, a person could lose a stored-value
card and someone else could find it. Or a stranger could gain access
to Ecash codes. Contracts realistically cannot specify all of the rights
of the parties involved in these situations because the parties do not
deal with each other. Courts will have to look to other sources to
determine the applicable rules.
Second, even when the parties can form a contract, transaction
costs may prohibit them from agreeing upon detailed terms. People
making payments generally want speedy transactions. Dickering over
the terms of payment often would make the process prohibitively slow.
For example, a customer who writes a check to a grocery store does
not want to spend time with the manager of the store discussing trans-
fer and presentment warranties or the rights of the store upon de-
fault. The customer simply wants to write the check and go home. If
the customer and the store had to discuss all of the rules regarding
checks before using them, checks would become impractical. Statutes
solve this problem by specifying the promises and warranties that a
drawer of a check makes and the rights that the payee has.92
89 See id. § 4A-302(b).
90 See id. U.C.C. Prefatory Note art. 4A (explaining the need for article 4A).
91 See, e.g., id. § 3-301 (1995) (specifying who may enforce an instrument).
92 See id. § 3-414 (specifying the obligation of the drawer); id. § 3-416 (specifying
warranties made upon the transfers of instruments).
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Users of new payment devices similarly may find agreeing upon
detailed contractual terms impossible. People who purchase stored-
value cards, for instance, often buy them from vending machines.
Some machines do not say anything about contractual terms. Other
machines contain placards stating a few contractual terms, but not
nearly enough to resolve complex disputes. Very few, for example,
discuss the rights that the buyer will have if the issuer becomes insol-
vent. That subject might prove too embarrassing. Similarly, the plac-
ards generally do not discuss warranties that the buyer will make in
transferring the card or using it for payment. No one would have
time to pay attention to this kind of detail.
Third, even when parties can sit down to make detailed contracts,
they still may leave gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in their agree-
ments. This problem plagues contracts in many contexts. 93 In the
case of new payment devices, it seems especially likely. Because of the
novelty of new payment devices, no one can know in advance exactly
what kinds of disputes will arise. Courts again will have to look at
sources other than the contracts themselves for answers.
Fourth, society often does not want to allow parties to have the
freedom to specify all of the terms of their contracts. Some restric-
tions on the terms of payment transactions may promote economic
efficiency. Article 3 of the UCC, for instance, forbids parties to alter
some of the rules governing checks because the automated check
processing system requires uniformity. For instance, drawers cannot
make checks non-negotiable.
94
Other restrictions on payment devices may serve distributive or
paternalistic objectives. 95 For example, federal statutes and regula-
tions limit consumer liability for the unauthorized use of credit cards
93 The official commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests several
ways that omissions of terms could occur: "The parties to an agreement may entirely
fail to foresee the situation which later arises and gives rise to a dispute; they then
have no expectations with respect to that situation, and a search for their meaning
with respect to it is fruitless. Or they may have expectations but fail to manifest them,
either because the expectation rests on an assumption which is unconscious or only
partly conscious, or because the situation seems to be unimportant or unlikely, or
because discussion of it might be unpleasant or might produce delay or impasse."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 204 cmt. b (1979).
94 See U.C.C. § 3-104(d) (1995).
95 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv.
563 (1982) (defining and discussing paternalism and distribution as substantive objec-
tives of the legal system).
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and debit cards to $50 in most instances. 96 The proponents of these
laws believe that banks should bear the additional costs of unauthor-
ized uses and that consumers should not have the power to agree to
higher limits of liability.97 For all of these reasons, contracts alone
cannot specify all of the rules necessary for new payment devices.
B. Specific Codes
Congress and the state legislatures traditionally have overcome
the shortcomings of contracts by adopting specific codes to govern
popular payment devices. Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, for example,
spell out the rules governing checks.98 Article 4A states the rules gov-
erning funds transfers. 99 Article 5 states the rules for letters of
credit.100 Federal statutes and regulations supplement these arti-
cles, 101 and also state rules applicable to consumer electronic fund
transfers and credit cards.'02
In theory, just as the federal and state governments created stat-
utes and regulations to govern these devices, they also could create
detailed new codes to govern new payment devices. For example, they
could ask the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) to draft
an article 4B for the UCC to govern stored-value cards, an article 4C
to govern Ecash, and an article 4D to govern VirtualPINs. The new
articles could include all of the rules that parties might fail to specify
by contract.
Although nothing prevents Congress and the states from taking
this approach, they probably will not. Developing and implementing
detailed codes requires great technical, financial, and political re-
sources. The NCCUSL and ALl took many years to draft and imple-
96 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (a) (1) (B) (1994) (credit cards); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (1)
(1995) (credit cards); id. § 205.6(b) (1996) (debit cards).
97 SeeRobert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory ofLoss Allocationfor Consumer
Payments, 66 TEx. L. REv. 63 (1987) (discussing in depth the problem of consumer
protection in payment law).
98 SeeU.C.C. § 3-102 (1995) (defining the scope of article 3); id. § 4-102 (defining
the applicability of article 4).
99 See id. § 4A-102 (defining the subject matter of article 4A).
100 See id. § 5-103 (defining the scope of artide 5).
101 See RegulationJ, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-.32 (1996) (regulating collection of checks
and funds transfers); Regulation CC, id. § 229.1-.42 (regulating availability of funds
and collection of checks).
102 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637, 1642-45, 1666-66j (1994) (credit cards); id. §§ 1693-93r
(consumer electronic funds transfers); Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.14 (1996)
(consumer electronic funds transfers); Regulation Z, id. §§ 226.1-.16 (credit cards).
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ment each article of the UCC.103 The task, moreover, involved the
efforts of leading scholars who could spend years on the project.
10 4
Eventually the states or the federal government may decide that they
need a detailed code for certain payment devices, like stored-value
cards. But creating new codes for all new devices would require mas-
sive commitments that seem unrealistic to expect.
Adopting specific codes for each new device, in addition, might
prove wasteful. Technological developments may render some de-
vices obsolete. For example, many people currently use the First Vir-
tual system because it allows them to make purchases on the Internet
without transmitting their credit card information. 0 5 In the future,
however, encryption technology may make sending credit card infor-
mation safer. If that happens, the First Virtual system might cease to
exist. A code governing the First Virtual system then would serve no
purpose.
Codes also may have the deleterious effect of hampering innova-
tion. For example, if states adopted a comprehensive law to govern
Ecash, then DigiCash, Inc. might cease attempting to refine and im-
prove the system. The company, understandably, might worry that al-
terations would create confusion. The code also might not allow
changes.
For these reasons, although specific codes in theory could over-
come the shortcomings of private contracts, Congress and state legis-
latures are unlikely to enact very many of them. Courts, as a result,
cannot expect to settle disputes over new payment devices either by
reference to private contracts or to specific statutes designed to gov-
ern the new devices. They will have to look elsewhere for legal rules.
C. A Comprehensive Code
If Congress and the state legislatures realistically cannot enact a
series of new codes to govern all new payment devices, they conceiva-
bly still may have a legislative alternative. In particular, they could
attempt to create a single comprehensive code with generic terms that
would govern any new payment device. In other words, they could
develop and enact one new statute that would apply to stored-value
cards, Ecash, VirtualPINs, and anything else that inventors might
devise.
103 SeeJAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1 (3d
ed. 1988) (discussing the history of the drafting of the UCC).
104 See id.
105 See supra Part I.A.3.
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A single comprehensive code might have several advantages over
a collection of specific codes. Drafting and implementing a single
code might cost less and take less time than drafting and implement-
ing a specific code for each new payment device. A comprehensive
code also should not become obsolete if some new payment devices
ceased to exist. For instance, even if people stopped using Virtu-
alPINs, the statute still could regulate stored-value cards and Ecash.
Any discussion of a comprehensive code, however, must take into
account an important, but ill-fated project of the Permanent Editorial
Board (PEB) of the UCC. In 1974, the PEB formed a committee to
review articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Code. The committee consisted of
Boston attorney Robert Haycock, Professor Hal Scott of Harvard, and
Professor Peter Murray of Maine. 10 6 After meeting with interested at-
torneys in 1978, the members of the "3-4-8 Committee" decided that,
instead of revising existing articles of the UCC, they should develop
an entirely new article to govern all payment devices.
10 7
The committee originally decided to call the new article the "New
Uniform Payments Code," but later changed the name to the "Uni-
form New Payments Code" (UNPC). 10 8 By 1982, the committee had
produced a series of disussion drafts written in the style of the other
articles of the UCC. The UNPC contained ingenious generic provi-
sions that strived to specify all of the rules for checks, credit cards, and
funds transfers.109
The drafters hoped that the UNPC would unify payment law,
much as article 9 of the UCC earlier had unified the law of secured
transactions."10 Unification, they believed, could promote economic
efficiency. If one code governed all devices, users would not decide
which devices to use based on differences in legal rules."' Instead,
they would pick devices by comparing economic costs and benefits,
like fees, speed, safety, and so forth. 112
106 See WmLAM D. HAWLAND, ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 4-101
(1982); Deborah S. Prutzman, Chips and the Proposed Uniform New Payments Code, 10
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 1, 1 (1983).
107 See Hawkland, supra note 106, § 4-101; James V. Vergari, A Critical Look at the
New Uniform Payments Code, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 317, 317 (1983).
108 See Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, New Uniform Payments Code
(Oct. 7, 1982) (Discussion Draft No. 8).
109 See Edward Rubin, Efficieny, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Artides 3 and 4,42
AlA. L. REV. 551, 557 (1991).
110 See id.
111 See Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1664 (1983); HAWK.AND, supra note 106, § 4-101.
112 See Hal S. Scott, Report to the "348" Committee of the PEB for the UCC 40 (Feb. 8,
1978) (available at PEB, 4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104) (stating that a
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Unification of payment law, the drafters believed, could also
make it easier for businesses and consumers to learn the rules gov-
erning different devices.113 At present, as noted, a patchwork of dif-
ferent laws and contracts govern checks, wire transfers, and credit
cards. The rules for each device differ from the rules for other de-
vices. Many users, especially consumers, do not know the differences.
They also sometimes do not know which rules govem a particular
device.11
4
The UNPC also had another potential advantage. The code
would have provided, for the first time, a body of law to govern whole-
sale wire transfers." 5 At the time of its drafting, article 4A of the UCC
did not exist. Although Congress had enacted a law governing con-
sumer electronic fund transfers, wholesale wire transfers remained
subject to private contracts and common law." 6
Despite these perceived advantages, and the skillful drafting of
the committee, the UNPC project soon encountered political
problems. The difficulties mostly concerned consumer protection is-
sues. The New York Clearing House Association, a group that repre-
sented the interests of a group of large banks, feared that the UNPC
would impose new consumer protection provisions on the checking
system.1 7 Consumer groups, meanwhile, worried that the UNPC
would reduce existing protection in connection with credit cards." 8
Neither group seemed willing to bend.
Opponents of the UNPC also perceived a number of practical
difficulties. Some people saw little benefit to unifying the law, doubt-
ing that legal rules played much of a role in the choice between differ-
ent payment systems." 9 Others objected to scrapping existing codes
for checks and other payment devices because these codes had wide-
spread support in their current forms. 120 Others worried that a single
code could not address the unique aspects of particular payment de-
comprehensive code could "eliminate artificial, legally imposed advantages of one
payment system over another"); Vergari, supra note 107, at 318.
113 See HAwKLAND, supra note 106, § 4-101.
114 See Scott, supra note 112, at 97 (noting that the "difficulties in defining the
boundaries of legislation offer a strong reason for a comprehensive payment code").
115 See Scott, supra note 111, at 1664-66, 1715.
116 See U.C.C. Prefatory Note art. 4A (1995).
117 See Rubin, supra note 109, at 557-58.
118 See id. at 558; Note, Overcoming the Obstacles to the Implementation of Point-of-Sale
Electronic Transfer Systems: EFTA and the New Uniform Payments Code, 69 VA. L. REv. 1351,
1361-64 (1983) (noting opposition to rule designed to change consumer liability).
119 See Anne Geary, One Size Doesn't Fit All-Is a Uniform Payments Code a Good Idea ?,
9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 337, 338 (1983); Prutzman, supra note 106, at 1-2.
120 See Vergari, supra note 107, at 325.
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vices.' 2 1 Still others felt that drafting a comprehensive code to govern
all payment devices would hinder the development of newer devices
such as electronic funds transfers. 122
In 1984, for all of these reasons, the PEB decided to cancel the
UNPC project.123 Thinking that the opposition would preclude
agreement on the statute, the PEB set its sights on a less radical goal.
It decided simply to redraft portions of articles 3 and 4 and to develop
a new article 4A that would govern wholesale funds transfers.'
24
The demise of the Uniform New Payments Code project provides
substantial reason to doubt that a comparable model statute will ever
govern all new payment devices. A new code, admittedly, could avoid
some of the difficulties that plagued the UNPC. For example, if the
new code did not seek to govern established payment devices, like
checks, credit cards, and wire transfers, it could avoid some of the
political obstacles encountered by the UNPC. It also would not
threaten the laws governing existing payment devices.
A uniform code designed to govern all new payment devices,
however, might run into two of the same obstacles faced by the UNPC.
First, the Code might blur some of the distinctions between the pay-
ment devices. First Virtual and DigiCash, for example, may need
some slightly different rules for their Internet payment systems. Sec-
ond, a single uniform code also might stifle the development or im-
provement of new devices. Many new payment devices, particularly
those on the Internet, remain in their infancy. Experimentation cer-
tainly will cause the backers of these systems to change some of the
rules governing their operation.
In addition to these practical problems, another factor makes the
drafting of a new comprehensive code all the more unlikely. The fail-
ure of the UNPC meant that a number of very talented scholars had
wasted years of effort. Memory of this frustrating experience might
dissuade qualified people from devoting their time to another project
along the same lines.
D. Common Law Rules
If contracts do not specify all of the rules, and legislatures seem
unlikely to enact specific or generic codes, the law governing payment
devices will have to come from another source. Courts simply will
121 See id.; Geary, supra note 119, at 339.
122 See Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAW. 1007, 1008
(1986); Geary, supra note 119, 341.
123 See Miller, supra note 122, at 1008.
124 See Prutzman, supra note 106, at 30 (recommending this approach).
IL997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
have to develop the law on a case by case basis as disputes arise. The
common law rules they create will play a major role in governing pay-
ment devices.
History supports the common law approach. Courts devised and
settled the rules governing negotiable instruments and letters of
credit in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 125 In the twentieth
century, prior to the enactment of statutes, they formulated a number
of the rules governing credit cards and wire transfers in a case by case
manner. 126
Developing legal rules to govern new payment devices in a com-
mon law fashion has definite shortcomings. Because many payment
transactions involve small sums of money, few cases warrant litigation.
The process, therefore, takes a long time. In addition, conflicts may
develop among different jurisdictions, complicating the use of pay-
ment devices across state lines.
Given the inevitability of some common law development, how-
ever, courts will have to deal with these difficulties. The following por-
tions of this Article discuss how courts should formulate new common
law rules. Although the recommendations will not solve all the
problems, they attempt to make the best of an unavoidable situation.
III. APPROACHES TO FORMULATING COMMON LAW RULES
If courts will have to develop common law rules to govern new
payment devices, the important question arises of how they should
decide which rules to create. Courts traditionally have used two meth-
ods to formulate common law rules for commercial transactions.
Some courts have attempted to adopt rules based on what the parties
presumably would want-but might not state-when they enter into a
payment transaction. Other courts have attempted to fashion rules
for new payment devices by analogizing them to existing payment
devices.
The following discussion considers but rejects as inadequate both
of these traditional approaches. It recommends, instead, that courts
attempt to create rules based on general principles of payment law, or
the basic ideas underlying the rules that govern existing payment de-
vices. Although the general principles approach has some drawbacks,
it generally will work better than the presumed intent or the analogy
approaches.
125 See Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CRIGH-
TON L. REv. 441, 446-50 (1979) (discussing the history of negotiable instruments law).
126 See EDWARD L. RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES, MATERI-
ALS, AND ISSUES 715-17 (2d ed. 1994).
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A. The Presumed Intent Approach
When no statute or contractual provision settles a dispute over a
new payment device, a court might fashion a common law rule based
on the presumed intentions of the parties. In other words, the court
could attempt to decide what parties typically want when they enter
into transactions of the kind at issue. It then could formulate rules
that would effectuate their likely desires.
Courts used this method of decision in creating common law
rules to decide early credit card cases. For example, in Union Oil Co. v.
Lull, a court confronted a dispute regarding liability for unauthorized
charges on a stolen card.1 27 The contract between the card issuer and
cardholder did not state the issuer's duties with respect to stolen
credit cards.' 28 In formulating a rule to cover the situation, the court
saw its task as one of "striving to determine the meaning which the
parties attached to their bargain."' 29 After careful consideration of
what the parties apparently wanted, the court found "an implied
promise on the part of the [issuer] to exercise reasonable diligence"
to protect the customer.8 0 It then created a general rule requiring
issuers to exercise that diligence.' 13 Applying the same method to a
different issue, the court in Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Greif refused to find
an implied term requiring a cardholder to surrender all cards before
closing his account.
3 2
Statutes now regulate certain aspects of credit cards. The pre-
sumed intent approach, however, continues to exist. Some courts still
consider the parties' presumed intentions in credit card cases if no
statute or contractual provision addresses an issue.'33
Courts may want to use the presumed intent approach to create
rules to govern new payment devices. For instance, suppose a ques-
tion arises about whether a party has the right to revoke a payment
made with a stored-value card. A court could decide the issue by con-
127 349 P.2d 243 (Or. 1960).
128 See id. at 248.
129 Id. at 249.
130 Id. at 250.
131 See id. at 254.
132 197 N.Y.S.2d 522, 523-24 (App. Div. 1960). For a very early similar example in
which a court refused to find an implied term based on the parties' intentions, see Lit
Bros. v. Haines, 121 A. 131, 132 (N.J. 1923) (finding no implied term to pay for unau-
thorized charges made on a credit "coin").
133 See, e.g., FDIC ex rel College Boulevard Nat'l Bank v. National Consumer Alli-
ance, Inc., No. CIV.A93-2269-EEO, 1994 WL 544119, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 1994)
(finding an implied promise to pay for charge backs based on the parties' presumed
intentions).
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sidering what rule the cardholder and the recipient of payment would
have desired when they entered into the transaction. It then could
incorporate that intention into a common law rule.
Although the presumed intent approach may function ade-
quately in some cases, it has several very significant shortcomings.
First, the approach does not work in cases where parties have had no
dealings with each other before a dispute arises. For example, sup-
pose a thief steals a stored-value card and sells it to a good faith pur-
chaser for value. In attempting to settle a controversy between the
original owner and the good faith purchaser, the court could not look
to any implied agreement or understanding between the two parties
because they never had the opportunity to form a contract.
Second, even when the parties may have formed an implied con-
tract, courts often will have extreme difficulty determining what they
would have wanted. Parties to contracts may fail to include terms be-
cause they have no specific intent one way or the other. 34 For exam-
ple, two parties to an Ecash transaction might not think about the
possibility that an issuer of Ecash could become insolvent. If the par-
ties never had any intention with respect to an issue, or a court cannot
determine with any certainty what they intended, their intentions can-
not serve as the basis for creating a new rule.
Third, the presumed intent approach rests on the idea that the
parties to a payment transaction have the power to determine the gov-
erning rules. Yet, as noted above, parties to payment system transac-
tions traditionally have not enjoyed complete freedom of contract.
The legal system, in some instances, needs to impose immutable rules
for efficiency, distributive, or paternalistic reasons.13 5 These goals at
times may have to override the parties' presumed intentions.
For all of these reasons, commentators generally have recom-
mended that courts should not attempt to fill gaps left by contracts
and statutes solely by reference to the presumed intentions of the par-
ties. The official commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, for example, states that "where there is in fact no agreement,
the court should supply a term which comports with community stan-
dards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model
of the bargaining process." 13 6 The task in fashioning common law
rules to govern new payment devices, as a result, lies in finding an-
other approach that will produce fair and sensible results.
134 See supra note 93 (identifying reasons that parties omit terms from their
contracts).
135 See supra Part IIA.
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981).
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B. The Analogy Approach
Although some courts have determined the rules for new pay-
ment devices using the presumed intent approach, other courts have
employed what might be called the analogy approach. In using the
analogy approach, a court attempts to discern the existing payment
device that most closely resembles the new payment device. The court
then fashions common law rules to govern the new payment device by
analogy.
For example, before adoption of article 4A of the UCC, some
courts decided funds transfer cases with reference to the rules in arti-
cles 3 and 4.137 Although the courts recognized that these articles did
not govern the transactions, they nonetheless looked to them for gui-
dance and applied them by analogy. The Code, to some extent, sup-
ports this approach.138 Courts similarly have consulted article 5,
which governs letters of credit, for rules that they could apply by anal-
ogy in credit card cases. 139
Courts could employ the analogy approach to decide cases involv-
ing new payment devices such as stored-value cards, Ecash, and Virtu-
alPINs. They could determine what existing devices these new devices
most closely resemble-cashier's checks, credit cards, personal
checks, or whatever-and then fashion new rules by analogy. In this
way, the courts would have guidance in formulating the common law
rules that they inevitably will have to construct. Like the presumed
intent approach, the analogy approach sometimes will produce appro-
priate results.
137 See, e.g., Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank, 790 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir.
1986) (looking to the rules in article 3 and 4 governing fraud loss); Evra Corp. v. Swiss
Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing the rules in article 4 gov-
erning consequential damages, but assuming that they do not apply); Delbrueck &
Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (looking
to rules in article 3 regarding the finality of checks).
138 See U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1995) (noting that "it may be appropriate ... for a
court to apply one or more provisions of article 3 ... by analogy" if the court takes
into account the necessary differences).
139 See, e.g., Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Lindauer, 513 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632-
33 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Preston State Bank v. Jordan, 692 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. App.
1985). For commentators drawing this analogy, see Kate M. Landey, Consumer-Card-
holder Defenses in Tripartite Credit Card Arrangements: A Battleground for the Beleaguered
Bank, 88 CoM. LJ. 84, 93 (1983); Eric E. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the
Cashless Society, 8 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 485, 502-03 (1967); John R. Martzell,
Note, Credit-Credit Cards-Civil and Criminal Liability for Unauthorized or Fraudulent
Use, 35 NoTRE DAME LAW. 225, 226-28 (1959); L. Hayden Thompson, Jr., Comment,
The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to Modern Bank Card Systems, 18 U. KAN. L.
REV. 871 (1970); 20 AM. Jun. 2D Credit Cards and Charge Accounts § 8 (1996).
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Courts, however, cannot rely on an analogy approach in all in-
stances. Despite its widespread use, the approach has two very signifi-
cant shortcomings. First, as a practical matter, courts often have
difficulty deciding which payment device a new payment device most
closely resembles. A new payment device may look like one estab-
lished payment device in some respects, but may resemble another
payment device in other respects. Attempts to pick the most closely
analogous device may produce a great deal of disagreement.
The experience with credit cards illustrates this concern. Some
courts and commentators, as noted above, have analogized credit
cards to letters of credit. Many others, however, have rejected that
analogy, pointing out significant difference between the two de-
vices. 140 Indeed, they have not seen credit cards as closely analogous
to any other existing payment devices.
New payment devices may suffer from the same problem. Con-
sider, for example, stored-value cards. In some ways, these cards re-
semble cashier's checks or money orders. Customers buy them from a
bank, they have value, and customers can spend them. Customers,
however, may view stored-value cards more like credit or debit cards
because they will use them as substitutes for these devices. Indeed, a
bank may issue one plastic card that the consumer could use as a
credit, debit, or stored-value card.
A court attempting to decide a dispute involving a stored-value
card might have difficulty deciding which type of established payment
device the stored-value card most resembles. This difficulty, needless
to say, matters a great deal. The rules governing cashier's checks dif-
fer substantially from the rules governing debit and credit cards.
Second, as a theoretical matter, the analogy approach cannot re-
solve all questions because all analogies eventually break down.
141 An-
alogical reasoning rests on a presumption that, because two things are
the same in some respects, they should be the same in other respects.
But this presumption never holds true in all cases. Two different
140 See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT
CARDS § 11.02 [5] (3d ed. 1990); JOHN R. FONSECA, 1 HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT
CASES § 10:3, at 401-02 (3d ed. 1986); Mary E. Mathews, Credit Cards-Authorized Use
and Unauthorized Use, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 233, 242 (1994); Stephen L. Sepinuck,
Classifying Credit Card Receivables Under the UC.C.: Playing with Instruments?, 32 ARiz. L.
REv. 789, 813 n.138 (1990); Donald H. Maffly & Alex C. McDonald, Comment, The
Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CAL. L. REv. 459, 465-68 (1960);
William B. Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the UCC, 85 BANKING L.J. 941, 968-69
(1968) (listing significant differences between letters of credit and credit cards).
141 See W. WARD FEARNSIDE & WILLIAM B. HOLTHER, FALLAcY: THE COUNTERFEIT OF
ARGUMENT 22-27 (1959) (discussing the limits of analogical reasoning).
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things cannot resemble each other in all respects without being identi-
cal. 142 Courts applying analogical reasoning, unfortunately, have no
sure way to know when an analogy no longer provides a useful basis
for comparison.
For example, courts looking at bank credit cards may see that
they resemble letters of credit in several ways. On this basis, they may
assume that they should resemble each other in other ways. Perhaps
they should. But that does not mean that they should resemble each
other in all ways. Analogical reasoning does not guide courts in know-
ing where the stopping point should be.
These theoretical difficulties may lead to two negative conse-
quences. At a minimum, the analogy approach tends to create confu-
sion because no one can know where courts will cut off the analogy.143
Worse yet, in applying the approach, courts may extend the analogy
so far that the results may not make sense as a matter of economics or
other social policy.'4
C. The General Principles Approach
Because of the difficulties associated with the presumed intent
and analogy approaches, the author recommends a different method
for devising common law rules to govern new payment devices. In-
stead of looking to the parties' presumed intentions or to analogous
payment devices, courts should rely on general principles of payment
law. The general principles of payment law are the basic ideas and
policies that underlie the rules governing existing payment devices.
1. Explanation of the General Principles Approach
The general principles approach, as the author envisions it, in-
volves several steps. The court first must attempt to state the issue
before it in general terms. For example, suppose a customer uses a
stored-value card to pay a merchant. The customer then has a change
of heart and wants to do something to undo the payment transaction.
142 Professors James J. White and Robert S. Summers once explained: "[A] letter
of credit is a letter of credit. As Bishop Butler once said, 'Everything is what it is and
not another thing."' WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 103, § 19-2, at 816.
143 See U.C.C. Prefatory Note art. 4A (1995) (observing that article 4A is needed
because courts are deciding funds transfers issues by reference to "principles of law
applicable to other payment mechanisms that might be applied by analogy" and
"[t]he result is a great deal of uncertainty").
144 See Mathews, supra note 140, at 242 (explaining the negative consequences of
applying letter of credit rules to credit cards).
1997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Assume further that no statute or contractual provision addresses the
issue.
The court might see the case as raising the issue of when the user
of payment devices may cancel, revoke, or stop a payment made to a
payee. After stating the issue in this fashion, the court then would
consider how the rules governing existing payment devices would an-
swer it. In particular, the court would consider whether or when a
person could stop a payment made with cash, personal or cashier's
checks, credit cards, wire transfers, letters of credit, and any other ex-
isting payment devices.
After surveying the existing payment devices, the court then
would attempt to discern whether any generally-stated principles
might explain the results. Part IV of this Article suggests several possi-
ble principles. 145 Once the court discerns the appropriate general
principles, the court applies them to resolve the dispute over the new
payment device.
2. Arguments for the General Principles Approach
Before discussing further examples in depth, consideration of the
arguments for the general principles approach would seem appropri-
ate. Courts may find the general principles approach more compli-
cated than the presumed intent or analogy approaches. Yet it has a
number of advantages.
First, the general principles approach does not require courts to
inquire about what the parties intended when they entered a payment
transaction. It thus can handle the many cases described above in
which the parties did not have any particular intent. It also will work
in cases in which the parties' intent, for policy reasons, should not
control.
Second, the general principles approach avoids the practical diffi-
culties associated with the analogy approach. Courts using the gen-
eral principles approach do not have to decide which existing
payment device a new payment device most closely resembles. In-
stead, courts applying the approach look at all of the different estab-
lished payment devices. Sometimes a new payment device will follow
the rules applicable to one established payment device, and other
times it will follow the rules applicable to another. For example, in
some ways stored-value cards may act like checks; in other ways they
may act like debit cards.
Third, the general principles approach avoids the theoretical dif-
ficulties associated with the analogy approach. Because courts are not
145 See infra Part I.B.1.
[VOL- 72:3
NEW PAYMENT DEVICES
relying on analogies, they do not have to worry about the analogies
breaking down. Instead, they look for general principles that make
sense for all payment devices. Courts then apply those principles to
produce results in specific cases.
Fourth, the general principles approach should produce rules
that conform to the expectations and desires of most parties. Con-
sumers and businesses presumably like the general principles underly-
ing most existing payment devices. After all, they use the devices in
billions of transactions each year. Extending these principles to new
payment devices, as a result, should not produce unwelcome rules.
Fifth, the general principles approach allows courts to take advan-
tage of the wisdom gained from hundreds of years of experience. The
rules governing most payment devices have evolved to take into ac-
count numerous economic and practical considerations. Checks op-
erate as they do because experience has proven that the rules
governing their use make sense. By reducing the rules governing ex-
isting payment devices into general principles, courts may retain and
carry on much of this learning.
Sixth, the general principles approach may help courts develop
the law governing new payment devices more quickly. Once courts go
through the trouble of discerning general principles in one case, they
can apply those principles in other cases. For example, in answering a
question about stored-value cards, the court may learn general princi-
ples applicable to Ecash and VirtualPINs.
Finally, the general principles approach will tend to fulfill the
principal ambition of the failed UNPC. In particular, the approach
will tend to reduce irrational legal differences between payment de-
vices. The same general principles of law will apply to all new devices.
As a result, economics-rather than strategic choices based on differ-
ences in law-will govern the choice of payment devices.
3. Potential Criticism of the General Principles Approach
Although the general principles approach has many arguments
in its favor, the author also recognizes that it has several problems.
These problems deserve attention because courts may confront them
in deciding among the general principles approach, the analogy ap-
proach, and the presumed intent approach. The following concerns
are perhaps the most significant.
First, courts may have difficulty ascertaining the general princi-
ples underlying the rules governing existing payment devices. Some
rules have historical justifications that have lost much of their validity.
The law governing checks, for example, presumes that banks can
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check all drawers' signatures, even though automated check process-
ing now makes that presumption implausible.?4 Other rules may re-
flect political compromises. No general principle, for instance, can
explain why Congress capped a consumer's liability for unauthorized
credit card use at $50, rather than $40 or $70.147
Second, in examining existing devices, courts may see conflicting
principles. For example, a principle rooted in economic efficiency
may explain the rules governing one payment device (such as a letter
of credit), while paternalistic principles explain the rules for another
device (such as a debit card). In this situation, the court cannot rely
on general principles alone in determining what rule to apply to new
payment devices. Instead, the court will have to choose among com-
peting devices.
Finally, courts sometimes may disagree with the principles they
discern in established payment devices and may not want to apply
those principles. For example, suppose that a court discovers that all
payment devices follow a particular rule about payee's right of re-
course against the payor if something goes wrong. The court may de-
cide that, no matter how universally shared, this principle contradicts
an important social policy. The court, for this reason, might not want
to extend the principle to a new payment device.
Although the general principles approach may suffer from all of
these problems, courts should keep these difficulties in perspective.
One way or another, courts will have to create new common law rules.
The general principles approach often will produce favorable results.
Nothing mandates, however, that courts use the general princi-
ples approach in all cases. Courts should view the approach as a help-
ful tool that they may employ when they find it useful. If they find the
analogy or presumed intent approaches more desirable in particular
cases, they should use them. The existence of the general principles
approach in no way limits what courts can-do.
IV. EXAMPLES OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPROACH
The following discussion illustrates how courts might rely on gen-
eral principles of payment law in creating common law rules to govern
146 Drawee banks generally pass back to collecting banks losses resulting from
forged indorsements, but not forged drawers' signatures. See U.C.C. § 4-205(a)
(1995) (establishing an implied warranty that collecting banks will violate when they
present checks bearing forged indorsements but not forged signatures). For an ex-
planation of the demise of the historical justification for these rules, see Perini Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1977).
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1) (B) (1994).
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new payment devices. After defining certain necessary terminology, it
works through three typical issues that might arise under new pay-
ment devices.
A. Terminology
Payment transactions tend to fall into four general categories.
For lack of better terms, the author will call them "direct cash pay-
ments," "indirect cash payments," "purchased cash substitute pay-
ments," and "created cash substitute payments." Familiarity with the
distinctions between these different types of payment transactions will
facilitate discussion of the general principles approach for creating
new common law rules.
(1) Direct Cash Payment
cash
payor payee
The simplest form of payment involves only the payor and the
payee. As illustrated in diagram (1), in a "Direct Cash Payment," the
payor makes the payment by giving cash directly to the payee. For
example, a consumer might pay for $10.50 in groceries using a $10
bill and two quarters.
Consumers and businesses use direct cash payments more often
than any other form of payment-148 Cash transactions, however, have
a significant limitation. They require the payor to transact personally
with the payee. This requirement presents problems when the payor
and payee are not located in the same place.
(2) Indirect Cash Payment
cash cash/credit
payor > facilitator- payee
To overcome the problems associated with direct cash payments,
a payor may opt for an "indirect cash payment." In this slightly more
complicated type of transaction, the payor transmits cash to the payee
by using a third-party to facilitate the transaction. As shown in dia-
148 See Humphrey & Berger, supra note 1, at 77.
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gram (2), the payor gives cash to the facilitator, who then gives cash or
credit to the payee.
Wire transfers, made through banks or other commercial funds
transfers systems, generally qualify as indirect cash payments. For ex-
ample, a payor in New York might use Western Union to transfer
money to a payee in San Francisco. The payor would deliver the cash
to one of Western Union's offices in New York. Western Union then
would notify the payee to pick up the same sum at an office located in
San Francisco. 149
As an alternative to making a direct or indirect payment of cash,
payors sometimes give payees a cash substitute. A cash substitute is
something which is not cash, but which the payor can spend like cash,
and which the payee later may convert to cash. The payor can acquire
a cash substitute in two ways.
(3) Purchased Cash Substitute Payment
cash cash cash
substitute substitute substitute
facilitator_ _ payor > payee _ facilitator
cash cash/credit
First, as shown by diagram (3), the payor can purchase the cash
substitute from a third-party facilitator. To make the payment, the
payor simply delivers the cash substitute to the payee. The payee (or
an agent) then may redeem the cash substitute for cash or credit from
the facilitator. Alternatively, the payee might use the cash substitute
to make a payment to a third party.
Cashier's checks, money orders, traveler's checks, and letters of
credit are traditional examples of purchased cash substitutes.150
Payors buy these instruments from banks or private companies and
149 Some indirect cash payments, like the one described above, involve only one
facilitator. Others may include several facilitators. For example, many international
funds transfers involve a series of intermediary banks who bring the payor and the
payee together. See, e.g., Sheerbonnet v. American Express Bank, 905 F. Supp. 127,
129 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing a funds transfer from Banque Scandinave to North-
ern Trust, to American Express Bank, to the Bank of Credit and Commerce in
London). These additional facilitators, however, do not alter the basic structure of an
indirect cash payment.
150 See U.C.C. § 3-104(g) (1995) (defining cashier's checks); id. § 3-104(i) (defin-
ing traveler's checks); id. § 3-104 cmt. 4 (describing money orders); id. § 5-102(a) (10)
(defining letters of credit).
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then transfer or remit them to payees. Payees may redeem the instru-
ments for cash or credit by presenting them to their issuers.
Some new payment devices fall into the category of purchased
cash substitutes. Stored-value cards and Ecash coins, for example,
serve as replacements for cash. The payor purchases these devices
from an issuer and then delivers them to a payee. The payee obtains
cash (or credit) by presenting codes from the cards or coins to the
issuer.
(4) Created Cash Substitute Payment
cash cash
substitute substitute notice
payor payee facilitator payor
cash/credit cash
Although payors sometimes buy cash substitutes, they also may
create them. As shown in diagram (4), a payor may produce a cash
substitute and then give it to the payee. The payee then may present
the substitute to a facilitator in exchange for cash or credit. The
facilitator, subsequently, requires the payor to reimburse it for the
payment.
Ordinary checks serve as a created cash substitute. The payor
draws the check and gives it to the payee. The payee then cashes the
check at the payor's bank. The payor's bank returns the cashed check
or otherwise gives notice to the payor. The payor then reimburses the
bank, usually by allowing the bank to debit the payor's account.I5 1
Credit card transactions also generally follow this model. To
make a payment, the payor completes a credit card slip for a payee.
The slip acts as a cash substitute. The payee presents the slip to the
issuer of the credit card. The issuer pays for the slip and then obtains
reimbursement by billing the payor.1
52
Some new payment devices may fall into the category of created
cash substitutes. In the First Virtual payment system, for example, the
payor initiates the transaction by sending the payee an email message
containing the payor's VirtualPIN. The payee then forwards the
message to First Virtual as a means of obtaining cash. The email
151 See id. § 4-401 (a) (stating when a bank may charge a customer's account for a
check).
152 See FRAZER, supra note 79, at 15-37 (describing credit card transactions).
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message, accordingly, serves as a cash substitute. After paying the
seller, First Virtual obtains reimbursement from the payor by charging
the payor's credit card.
153
Identifying these four categories of transactions serves only to
simplify the following discussion of general principles of payment law.
The categories themselves have little formal significance. For exam-
ple, checks sometimes follow different rules from credit card slips,
even though they both serve as created cash substitutes.
154
B. Examples
Any number of questions may arise in connection with new pay-
ment devices. Various aspects of any transaction may go wrong and
no statute or contractual provision may indicate what should happen.
The following three examples serve to illustrate how courts might ap-
ply the general principles approach in producing rules to govern un-
settled questions. Courts could apply the approach to other issues as
well.
1. Stopping or Rescinding a Payment
As noted above, sometimes after the payor initiates a payment
transaction, the payor will have a change of heart and will want to
cancel it.155 For example, the payor may give the payee a personal
check, and then later order the drawee bank to stop payment. Courts
in the future may have to determine when payors have the right to
stop or rescind payments made with new payment devices.
Consider, for instance, a transaction using the First Virtual Sys-
tem. Suppose that a customer sends a merchant a VirtualPIN author-
izing a transaction. The merchant forwards the VirtualPIN to First
Virtual. First Virtual contacts the customer for confirmation of the
transaction. The customer initially tells First Virtual to go ahead with
the payment. Shortly afterwards, the customer contacts First Virtual
and instructs it not to pay the merchant. May the customer stop pay-
ment at this point?
Assume that the First Virtual standard form contract does not an-
swer this question and that no statutes or regulations govern the trans-
action. A court confronted with the issue would have to decide it as a
153 See supra Part IA.3.
154 For example, absent negligence, a customer bears no liability for an unauthor-
ized check, but may bear $50 in liability for an unauthorized credit card charge. Com-
pare U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1995) (checks), with 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1) (B) (1994) (credit
cards).
155 See supra Part III.C.1.
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matter of common law. In formulating a rule to answer the question,
the court may consider general principles of payment law.
To determine the general principles of payment law, the court
first must discern the rules applicable to different existing payment
devices. In so doing, the court would observe that direct cash pay-
ment transactions follow a simple rule. A payor cannot stop a direct
cash payment because the transaction finishes as soon as it begins.
The payor makes the payment upon handing the money to the payee.
Nothing remains undone that the payor can stop.
A payor, however, can stop an indirect cash payment in certain
instances. Under article 4A, for instance, the payor has a right to can-
cel a payment order before the receiving bank has executed it.156 Af-
ter execution of the order, however, the payor generally has no right
to stop the payment transaction. 1
57
Payors generally cannot stop payments made with purchased cash
substitutes. The purchaser of a cashier's check or teller's check, for
example, cannot stop payment on the instrument after transferring it
to the payee.' 58 A typical letter of credit, similarly, does not permit
the applicant to stop payment. 59
The two principal created cash substitutes, checks and credit card
slips, follow slightly different rules. The drawer of a personal check
generally has the right to stop payment before the bank pays the in-
strument.160 The customer remains liable on the instrument to the
merchant, but the bank cannot pay it.161 A customer who authorizes a
credit card transaction, by contrast, does not have the right to stop the
issuing bank from paying the merchant.16
2
After making the foregoing observations, the court then would
look for general principles that would explain all of the rules. One
apparent principle is that the payor cannot stop payment once the
payor already has paid. This principle explains why payors cannot
stop direct cash payments. It also captures the limitations on stop pay-
ment orders in the context, of wire transfers and checks. The princi-
156 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(b) (1995).
157 See id. § 4A-211(c).
158 See id. § 4-403 cmt. 4.
159 See id. § 5-108(a) (describing the issuer's duty to honor letters of credit).
Although the issuer may create a revocable letter of credit, see id. § 5-106(b), most
letters of credit are not revocable.
160 See id. § 4-403(a).
161 See id. § 3-414 (describing the liability of a drawer); id. § 4-403 cmt. 7 (explain-
ing how the drawer remains liable on the instrument after stopping payment).
162 The customer, however, under certain conditions may assert against the issu-
ing bank any defenses that the customer has against the merchant. See infra Part
IV.B.3.
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ple further accounts for the conclusion that a person cannot stop
payment on cashier's checks and teller's checks. The purchasers of
these items pay for them at the time of issue. They thus already have
paid for them when they transfer them in payment to others.
A second principle appears to cover transactions in which pay-
ment has not occurred already. In particular, the payor cannot stop
payment when the payee is relying on the credit of a third-party (in-
stead of the payor) in accepting the payment device. This second
principle underlies the rules regarding credit cards, letters of credit,
and checks. Merchants take letters of credit and credit cards because
they know that a bank stands behind the payment. As a result,
merchants trust these devices more than they trust personal checks.
Permitting the customer to stop payment would undermine their se-
curity.1 63 By contrast, no one other than the payor stands behind the
payor's personal checks, and the payee accordingly has a less certain
expectation of payment.
After discerning general principles such as these, the court then
should apply them. Returning to the hypothetical First Virtual trans-
action described above, the application seems straightforward. The
first principle makes clear that the customer cannot stop payment if
First Virtual already has paid the seller. A request to stop payment at
that point would come too late.
With respect to a stop payment request made before First Virtual
has paid the merchant, a court would have to consider the following
question: Does a seller in taking a VirtualPIN rely on the customer's
credit or on a third party's credit? Although parties certainly could
debate the issue, the latter suggestion seems more likely.
A seller who has agreed to take payment from First Virtual knows
that First Virtual will process the transactions only if the customer has
a valid credit card with enough credit to pay for the transaction. The
merchant relies on First Virtual and the credit card issuer to make
sure that the payment comes through. The seller does not inquire
about the customer's financial resources.
As a result, as a matter of common law, a court should conclude
that a customer does not have a right to stop payment in a First Virtual
transaction after confirming the payment. This conclusion accords
with general principles of payment law that explain the rules for stop-
ping payment with the most common established payment devices.
163 This second principle, incidently, also provides an additional explanation for
why payors cannot stop payment on cashier's checks, teller's checks, or stored-value
cards. A merchant who accepts these devices in payment does not rely on the payor's
credit. Instead, the merchant relies on the issuer's credit.
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Consequently, it should not disrupt the payment system, it should ac-
cord with the general expectations of the parties, and it probably
makes economic sense.
2. Payee's Right of Recourse Against the Payor
Sometimes when the payor initiates a payment transaction using
a conventional payment device, something goes wrong and the payee
does not receive the money. For example, a payor may write a check
to the payee and the check might bounce. Or the payor may attempt
to transfer funds to the payee, but the funds may not arrive.
The same problem could arise in transactions involving new pay-
ment devices. A merchant, for example, could take payment from a
consumer in the form of Ecash or a stored-value card, and the issuer
of the device could become insolvent and fail to pay. Similarly, the
merchant could accept a VirtualPIN as payment, and First Virtual for
some reason might fail to transfer funds to the merchant's account.
When the payee does not receive payment, the question arises
whether the payee has a right of recourse against the payor-a right
to recover from the payor the amount of the attempted payment. If
no statute or contract specifies the answer to this question with re-
spect to a new payment device, the court again will need to fashion a
common law rule. General principles of payment law may guide the
court in formulating the rule.
To determine the applicable general principles, the court first
would examine all of the existing payment devices. Direct cash pay-
ments, again, require little analysis. The issue of failing to receive pay-
ment does not arise in direct cash payment transactions. If the payor
gives cash directly to the payee, the payee receives payment and has
nothing to complain about.
In transactions involving indirect cash payments, by contrast, the
payment sometimes does not arrive. The payor, for example, may or-
der a bank to transfer funds to the payee but the bank may fail to
comply with the order. Article 4A states that the payee does not re-
ceive payment until the funds reach the payee or the bank in which
the payee has an account. 64 Until then, the payee retains the right to
receive payment from the payor.
165
164 See U.C.C. § 4A-406(b) (1995) (specifying when a funds transfer discharges an
underlying obligation). Note that attempting to send money to the payee by itself
does not create an obligation in the payor. See id. § 4A-402 cmt. 3 (explaining that,
except for an accepting bank, "no other person has any rights against the sender with
respect to the sender's order").
165 See id. § 4A-406(b).
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In transactions involving created cash substitutes like checks and
credit cards, the payee also has a claim against the payor if payment
does not come through. For example, if the payee takes a check from
the payor and the check bounces, the payee may recover from the
payor either on the check or on the underlying claim.166 Similarly, if
the payee accepts a credit card payment and the credit card issuer for
whatever reason refuses to pay, the payee may claim the amount of the
charge from the payor. I 6
7
Transactions using purchased cash substitutes involve slightly
more complicated rules. A payee who takes a cashier's check from the
payor generally has no right of recourse against the payor if the bank
refuses to pay the check. 168 The payee only has lights against the
bank. 69 By contrast, if a payee fails to receive payment under a letter
of credit, the payee generally retains the right to collect from the
payor. 170
In sum, the rights of payees vary depending on the devices used.
On one hand, payees may recover from payors when personal checks
bounce, when wire transfers do not go through, or when they do not
receive payment under a letter of credit or credit card. On the other
hand, they have no right to recover against the payor when the issuer
of a cashier's check fails to pay.
A general principle emerges from these observations. In particu-
lar, if the payee fails to receive payment, the payee generally retains a
right of recourse against the payor. The payee, however, does not
166 See id. § 3-310(b) (3).
167 This requirement generally comes from private contracts with the card issuer
and the merchant accepting the card. Standard credit card slips usually refer to and
incorporate these contracts with some version of the following legend: "I agree to pay
the total above according to the card issuer agreement."
168 See U.C.C. § 3-310(a) (1995) (stating that a cashier's check discharges the un-
derlying obligation for which it is taken). The purchaser of the cashier's check can
incur liability by endorsing the check. See id. § 3-415 (a). Most purchasers of cashier's
checks, however, do not choose to incur this liability. See Gregory E. Maggs, Determin-
ing the Rights and Liabilities of the Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument: A Theory Applied to
Some Unsettled Questions, 36 B.C. L. REv. 619, 660-61 (1995).
169 See U.C.C. § 3-411(1995).
170 A letter of credit, unlike cashier's checks and wire transfers, does not discharge
the underlying obligation for which it is taken. Accordingly, if the payee does not
receive payment, the payee may sue the payor for breach of the underlying obligation
to pay. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & TOM L. HOLLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 5-111 (1995); ef. U.C.C. § 3-310(a) (1995) (cashier's checks); id. § 4A-406(b)
(wire transfers). Article 5 specifically permits the payor to recover from the issuer any
damages incurred in the suit by that payee, provided that the issuer acted wrongly in
refusing to pay. See id. § 5-111(b) (1995).
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have a right to recover payment from the payor if the payor paid for
the device prior to giving it to the payee.
This principle underlies the rules governing all of the devices.
Payors do not pay finally for checks, wire transfers, or letters of credit
until payment reaches the payee. 171 In contrast, payors generally have
to pay for a cashier's check or a teller's check in advance. It would not
make sense for payees to have a right of recourse against payors if the
issuer of these devices does not pay. Payors generally would not use
these devices if they could face further liability after already having
paid for them.
Applying these principles to the new payment devices considered
in Part I, the court might reach the following conclusions. If a payor
attempts to pay for something using the First Virtual system, and First
Virtual does not make the payment, the payor remains liable to the
payee. The payor does not have a duty to pay First Virtual until First
Virtual sends the money to the payee. A First Virtual transaction, in
this respect, resembles a transaction involving a check or funds
transfer.
On the other hand, if the payor uses a valid purchased cash sub-
stitute like Ecash or a stored-value card, and the issuer for some rea-
son does not make payment, the payee should have no recourse
against payor. The payor already has paid for these devices and most
likely would not use them unless the payee agreed to rely on the is-
suer's creditworthiness. The payee, as a result, should only have rights
against the issuer.
3. Responsibility for Claims Against the Payee
Sometimes a payor will discover that he or she has a claim against
the payee after making a payment. A customer, for instance, may pay
a merchant for goods and then not receive them. The customer then
will have a claim against the merchant for breach of contract.
A question arises whether the customer may assert this claim
against anyone other than the merchant. For example, suppose that a
customer buys a stored-value card from a bank. The customer inserts
the card into a vending machine to purchase some snack food. The
machine reads the card, subtracts an amount for payment, but does
not deliver the food.
171 See U.C.C. § 4-401 (a) (1995) (bank may charge customer's account only if it
pays a properly payable check); id. § 4A-402(d) (sender of payment order entitled to
refund if transfer does not go through); id. § 5-108(i) (1) (issuer of letter of credit
entitled to reimbursement by customer only upon payment to beneficiary).
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The consumer clearly has a claim against the merchant that owns
the machine.' 72 But the consumer may not know how to find the
merchant. Or the customer may live far away and find dealing with
the merchant over such a small sum too much trouble. The customer,
as a result, may want the bank that issued the card to refund the
money paid to the merchant.
No statute presently governs this issue. As a result, unless the is-
suer addressed the matter in a contract with the consumer, a court
would have to fashion a common law rule to decide the question.
Once again, general principles of payment law may guide the court.
The court should look for the relevant general principles by con-
sidering the rules applicable to established payment devices. Direct
cash payments once more follow a simple rule. A cash transaction
does not involve any third parties. As a result, the payor cannot assert
claims against anyone other than the payee.
In a funds transfer, the payor orders a bank to send the money to
the payor. 173 If the bank accepts the order, the payor has a duty to
pay the bank.174 Nothing in article 4A excuses the payor from paying
merely because the payor has a claim or defense against the payee.
Regulation E, similarly, contains no provision excusing consumers
from paying for their electronic funds transfers.
Purchased cash substitutes follow the same rule. A payor who
buys a cashier's check or teller's check generally pays for the instru-
ment in advance. After giving the check to the payee, the payor can-
not stop payment.175 If the payor discovers a claim against the payee,
the payor must sue the payee; nothing in articles 3 or 4 permits the
payor to assert the claim against the bank. The same is true for per-
sonal checks. Although the payor may stop the bank from paying the
check, the payor may not assert claims against the bank for authorized
checks that the bank already has paid.
Letters of credit follow the same strict rule. The issuer of the
letter of credit does not take responsibility for the performance of the
underlying transaction between the parties. 176 Once the bank pays
the letter of credit, the payor must reimburse the bank.1 77 The payor
who buys the letter of credit may not assert against the bank any
claims that payor has against the payee.
172 See id. § 2-711 (describing the buyer's rights upon the seller's failure to deliver
goods).
173 See id. § 4A-104(c).
174 See id. § 4A-402(c).
175 See id. § 4-403 cmt. 4.
176 See id. § 5-108(0 (1).
177 See id. § 5-108(i) (1).
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The same rule governs credit cards in non-consumer cases. The
cardholder must pay the card issuer for any authorized charges, even
if the cardholder has claims against the payee. In certain circum-
stances, however, a federal statute permits a consumer cardholder to
assert against the issuer of the card "all claims (other than tort claims)
and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the credit card is
used as a method of payment.'
78
From these observations, a general principle emerges. After the
payee receives the payment, the payor generally may assert claims aris-
ing out of the underlying transaction only against the payee. The
payor may not assert claims against any bank or other facilitator. This
principle extends to all established payment devices except for credit
cards when used by consumers.
No generalizable principle explains the special rule for credit
cards. It is simply an exception. The credit card rule, however,
should be viewed in context. Two aspects of the credit card rule make
its scope understandable.
First, the exception does not impose a great burden on credit
card issuers. Under standard credit card agreements, if a dispute
arises over a payment, the credit card issuer may charge back the
amount of the payment to the merchant's bank. 7 9 Because banks
know this rule, they generally refuse to grant credit card privileges to
unscrupulous merchants. 80
By contrast, any merchant can take a check or letter of credit in
payment. The merchant does not have to obtain approval from a
bank and, consequently, may not operate in a trustworthy manner.
Allowing credit card holders to assert claims against issuers, accord-
ingly, imposes less of a burden than would a comparable rule allowing
drawers of checks to assert claims against drawee banks if the payee in
some way harms them.
Second, the credit card exception applies only to consumers. It
thus reflects a general trend in the law not to make consumers pay for
items purchased on credit when they have not received them. The
FTC Holder in Due Course regulations and various provisions of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code also further the same goal.'
8 '
178 See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (1994).
179 See generally FRAZER, supra note 79, at 15-30.
180 See id.
181 See Federal Holder-In-Due-Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1, 433.2
(1996) (insuring that consumers may assert claims and defenses from sales transac-
tions against merchants and certain lenders); Uniform Consumer Credit Code
§§ 3.307, 3.404, 3.405 (1974) (same).
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This analysis makes possible the following recommendations. In
formulating common law rules for new payment devices, a court
should start with the presumption that payors may present claims aris-
ing from a payment transaction only against the payee. The court,
however, might create an exception like the one that exists for credit
cards. In deciding whether to create the exception, it should consider
whether any factors-such as the two described above-would make
the exception appropriate for the new payment device.
With respect to stored-value cards, the case for an exception
seems fairly strong. Most stored-value card systems require issuers to
approve the merchants that want to participate. The issuer of the
cards, therefore, will worry less about what will happen if it has to pay
a claim to a consumer. In addition, stored-value cards have primarily
consumer uses. As noted above, they generally come in small
denominations. 182
Allowing consumers to assert claims and defenses against issuers,
however, does have a drawback. In particular, it may deter merchants
from accepting stored-value cards. The merchant may worry that the
issuer of the card will charge back the amount of the payment. If the
merchant disputes the charge, the merchant then will have difficulty
finding the consumer and settling the matter.
To address this problem, a court might want to adopt limitations
on the exception like those that exist under federal law for credit
cards. In particular, the exception only applies for purchases of $50
or more that occur within the same state or within one hundred miles
of the purchaser's residence.18 3 A court, however, would not need to
follow these exact limitations; it could choose other comparable ones.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that courts will need to fashion common
law rules to govern transactions involving new payment devices. It
also has sought to demonstrate how courts should best exercise their
discretion in formulating these rules. The general principles ap-
182 See supra Part IA.1.
183 The credit card exception states:
The customer has a right to assert claims or defenses only if (1) the obligor
has made a good faith attempt to obtain satisfactory resolution of a disagree-
ment or problem relative to the transaction from the person honoring the
credit card; (2) the amount of the initial transaction exceeds $50; and (3)
the place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same State as the
mailing address previously provided by the cardholder or was within 100
miles from such address ....
15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (1994).
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proach, if properly followed, should produce favorable results. In-
deed, if it functions as predicted, the approach may avoid problems
that courts have encountered using the presumed intent and analogy
approaches.
The general principles approach, however, cannot supply all of
the rules necessary to govern a payment system. Professors Richard E.
Speidel, Robert S. Summers, andJamesJ. White have developed a use-
ful typology of six principal kinds of rules necessary to govern a pay-
ment system.' 8 4 They identify these rules as (1) rules of validation,
(2) rules of interpretation and construction, (3) substantive suppletive
rules, (4) rules of disclaimer, (5) policing rules, (6) third party protec-
tion rules, (7) priority rules, and (8) remedial suppletive rules and
procedures.1
8 5
The general principles approach mostly focuses on substantive
suppletive rules. These rules define the substantive private rights and
duties that the parties should have in a transaction, even if they have
not stated them by contract. 8 6 Courts should find creating these
rules similar to work that they always have done in developing the
common law. They may have more difficulty with the other kinds of
rules.
Consider, for example, policing and third-party protection rules.
Through these rules, the government attempts to protect participants
and society from possible harms that payment devices might cause.
Courts usually have left these kinds of rules to Congress, the state leg-
islatures, and administrative agencies.
The government, for example, regulates some payment devices to
deter their use in money laundering. In particular, it imposes record-
keeping requirements for certain transactions involving $10,000 in
cash and for certain purchases of cashier's checks for $3,000 or
more.'8 7 Several commentators have suggested that the government
may need to regulate stored-value cards or Ecash to prevent their use
in criminal activities.' 8 8




187 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1996) (imposing recordkeeping requirements on cer-
tain currency transactions); id. § 103.29 (imposing recordkeeping requirements for
the sale of certain cashier's checks).
188 See, e.g., Noel D. Humphreys, Cybercash, PA. LAW., May-June 1995, at 38 (discuss-
ing how stored-value cards permit stealth in payment); Ezra C. Levine, New Laundering
Concerns: Safety in Cyberspace, MONEY LAUNDERING 1 (Aug. 1995); Scott Sultzer, Money
Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 197
(1995).
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The government also currently insures some payment devices.
For example, federal deposit insurance backs many cashier's checks
sold in this country.18 9 This insurance promotes confidence in the
checks. The government similarly may want to insure other payment
devices and regulate their issuers.' 90
The government also has imposed certain consumer protection
requirements on payment devices. In particular, as noted several
times, Congress has limited consumer liability for unauthorized use of
credit and debit cards to a maximum of $50 in most instances.' 91 The
government may see a similar need to impose limitations on liability
in connection with new payment devices.
Courts may hesitate to impose these kinds of regulations on pay-
ment devices in a common law manner. The regulations involve
many policy choices that courts may feel uncomfortable making.
Their implementation also may require administrative action that the
courts cannot mandate or supply.
Nothing in the general principles approach described above,
however, prevents Congress, state legislatures, or administrative agen-
cies from devising these kinds of regulations. The regulations could
supplement any common law rules devised by courts. In other words,
although common law rules will not serve as a panacea, they also will
not stand in the way of other solutions.
Indeed, as noted in Part II above, state legislatures or Congress in
the future may decide that the rules governing some new payment
devices require comprehensive codification. For example, if the use
of stored-value cards becomes sufficiently widespread, states might
add an article 4B to the UCC to govern them. Nothing prevents this.
Although courts at present must create common law rules, Congress
and state legislatures may preempt or supplant court-made rules at
any time with legislation.
189 See 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1) (4) (1994) (defining "deposit" to include outstanding
cashier's checks).
190 See D. Lee Falls, Dateline 2005: Does Banking on the Internet Need to Be Regulated?,
BANKING POL'Y REP., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1 (discussing a range of safety and soundness
concerns with respect to new payment systems).
191 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1) (B) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (1) (1995) (credit
cards); id. § 205.6(b) (1996) (debit cards).
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